However, this general statement must be nuanced in several respects. On the one hand, this picture of 'problematic' political inclusion is not consistent across all dimensions of political integration. Indeed, migrants often are more confident of the political institutions and elites of the countries and cities in which they live, display similar levels of attachment to the country nationals as the native population, and often feel similarly effi cacious in relation to politics as the autochthonous population (see Morales, Chapter 2, and Anduiza and San Martín, Chapter 9 in this volume). On the other hand, as has been shown in several chapters throughout the volume, not all migrants are equally integrated politically. In other words, migrants from different national origins display different levels of political participation, interest, trust and so forth. This is partly due to the very characteristics of ethnic minorities at the collective level, for example in the socio-demographic composition and size of the group, its migration history, its socio-economic status and its political culture. In this volume, however, we have focused on the three sets of factors mentioned earlier in order to account for variations in the degree of political integration or inclusion at the individual level -human capital, social capital and political capital. Although this book should have made clear that these three sets of factors to some extent interact to explain the political integration of migrants, let us consider each of them separately for the sake of presentation. Our discussion will focus in particular on the components of integration which have represented the core of the analyses presented in this volume, namely interest in politics and political participation.
Individual characteristics and resources: the role of human capital
The study of political participation and, more generally, of political behaviour has traditionally focused on individual-level factors. In particular, since the seminal work by Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) and then the equally important study by Campbell et al. (1960) , political participation has been considered to be, above all, a matter of individual predispositions, attitudes and resources. In this vein, the so-called baseline or standard model of political participation (Verba and Nie, 1972; see further Nie et al., 1979; Verba et al., 1995) focuses on the resources individuals bring into the political process and the importance of the socio-economic status as measured through such variables as education, income and occupation.
The analyses provided by the chapters in this volume point to the importance of individual characteristics and resources. They provide what some have called, sometimes with a slightly different meaning, human capital (Becker, 1964; Bourdieu, 1972; Coleman, 1988 chapters in this volume. Thus, migrants who have obtained a higher level of education are more likely to participate politically in the country of residence than their less educated counterparts, and in some chapters it is shown that education is a more determinant resource for migrants than for the majority group (see, for example, Anduiza and San Martín, Chapter 9 in this volume).
As the literature has repeatedly shown, education is an important resource insofar as it provides migrants with the necessary civic skills to first understand the political situation and then become involved in politics (Verba et al., 1995) . Political interest is a further crucial individual characteristic when it comes to account for variations in the level of political participation of migrants. Again, this is in line with previous works, both those looking at participation in general (cf. Verba et al., 1978; Parry et al., 1992; van Deth et al., 2007) and those focusing more specifically on migrants (cf. Diehl and Blohm, 2001 ). Thus, both education and political interest are important predictors of the participation of migrants in the political life of the cities included in our study, but probably also beyond them. Yet showing that people who are more interested in politics are politically more engaged is of little informational value and it is pointing to the endogenous process that connects both components of engagement with politics. More interesting is to look at political interest as a dependent variable; in other words, something that has to be explained, rather than something that explains something else. Some of the chapters in this volume have done so (Morales and Pilati [5], Strömblad et al. [6] , and Morales and Morariu [7] ), suggesting that political interest represents an important dimension of the political inclusion of migrants in European cities.
Gender also typically adds an additional layer of inequality to the study of political engagement. Although we did not have sufficient space to pursue in detail the analysis of the various possible gender gaps, as well as the various gendered processes that underpin political integration, all chapters included gender in their analyses. We find, however, a mixed set of patterns that call for further and more refined studies. For example, with regard to political attitudes and orientations, the chapters in this volume found that migrant women are less likely to feel capable of understanding politics (internal political efficacy), but were no different to their male counterparts with regard to feelings of external political efficacy or confidence in political institutions (see Anduiza and San Martín, Chapter 9 in this volume). They are, nevertheless, less interested in both 'homeland' and 'host country' politics than men (see Morales and Pilati, Chapter 5, and Morales and Morariu, Chapter 7 in this volume). Interestingly enough, women feel more attached to their neighbourhoods than men, but are indistinguishable from them in feelings of attachment to the city (see Devadason, Chapter 11 in this volume). In terms of their political participation, overall, women are less inclined to be actively engaged in politics (cf. Cinalli and Giugni, Chapter 3 in In addition to these individual attributes commonly analysed in mainstream studies of political participation, the chapters in this volume have also allowed us to highlight the role played by certain factors specifically pertaining to the migration and settlement processes. The most important one is certainly the capability one has to understand, read and speak the language of the country of residence. As for the level of education, language proficiency is an important skill insofar as it allows one to grasp what is going on in the social and political environment. This, in turn, increases the chances that migrants will become involved in politics. The importance of acquiring fluency in the language spoken in the receiving country has been found to be a strong predictor of political participation in previous studies (Jacobs et al., 2004) , and all the chapters in this volume confirm that it has a positive and significant effect on every indicator of political integration that we have considered in this book.
Other individual-level factors have been found to play a role, but in a less systematic fashion. Some have to do with the relation of migrants with their country of residence. Thus, for example, how long a time they have resided there is important. The analyses reported in several chapters in this book have shown that, overall, the longer the duration of stay, the more likely is it that migrants participate in the political life of the host society. This, however, is not always true, as in some case there is no significant relationship between the length of stay and political interest or participation. For example, length of residence is not a significant predictor of interest in either 'homeland' or 'host country' politics, of political contacting, nor of overall levels of protest participation (Cinalli and Giugni, Chapter 3 in this volume), but this lack of significant association seems to be masking the fact that it has a negative (not significant) effect on ethnic protesting, while it has a positive effect on protest around mainstream issues (Morales and Pilati, Chapter 5 in this volume). Length of stay is equally not relevant for accounting for different levels of political efficacy and political confidence among immigrants (Anduiza and San Martín, Chapter 9 in this volume). Yet a longer period of stay increases the likelihood of voting -for those with voting rights -(González-Ferrer, Chapter 4 in this volume), and increases the feelings of attachment with both the neighbourhood and the city.
Curiously enough, second-generation migrants have not been found to substantially differ from first-generation migrants in most indicators of political integration, in spite of the fact that these are obviously those In contrast, being a citizen of the host country seems to have a more consistent positive effect on several aspects of political integration -particularly interest in politics and political action -suggesting that it is not simply a matter of time spent in a given place, but above all a matter of the rights and legitimacy one is granted as well as the feeling of belonging stemming from them. Yet it is important to highlight that this is not always the case for all forms of engagement with politics. For example, migrants who are in possession of the citizenship of the country where they live feel no more politically efficacious and show the same degree of confidence in the political institutions of those countries than those who do not have it (Anduiza and San Martín, Chapter 9 in this volume). Equally, being a national is often irrelevant for determining levels of attachment to the neighborhood or the city (Devadason, Chapter 11 in this volume). And though in all but the UK having the country's citizenship is required to be eligible to vote in national elections, we do not find evidence that supports the idea that those migrants holding the country passport are more inclined to vote in local elections (see Morales and Morariu, Chapter 7 in this volume).
Other individual characteristics and resources have less of an impact than one might have expected. For example, findings concerning feelings of discrimination are at best mixed, pointing in different directions depending on the cases studied. Morales and Morariu (Chapter 7 in this volume) find that feelings of discrimination have no significant impact on interest in politics, propensity to vote or political action when individuals of Ecuadorian, Moroccan and Turkish origin are considered. In contrast, Myrberg and Rogstad (Chapter 8 in this volume) find a mobilizing effect of feelings of discrimination in the two Scandinavian cities they study when accounting for levels of political contacting and 'low-voiced' protest acts. Hence, although discrimination is an important source of social exclusion, we find no evidence that it spills over to political exclusion or, alternatively, to greater mobilization resulting from perceived grievances. Similarly, religiosity, as measured by attendance at religious services, has little if any effect on the political participation and integration of migrants (Eggert and Giugni, Chapter 10 in this volume). Equally, very often, religious denomination itself -and specifically being a Muslim believer, which is often portrayed in public discourses as a 'problematic' identity for integration into western democracies -has no effect on many aspects of political integration. And in the cases where we find such an effect, the results are mixed and sometimes even contradictory. For example, Muslims seem to be less inclined to participate in politics when all forms of political action are considered jointly in a single indicator, but they are similarly inclined as people from other religions to protest (Cinalli and Giugni, Chapter 3 in this volume). Equally, Muslims seem to be less interested in politics, but are more likely to declare that they would vote in local elections if allowed (Morales and Morariu, Chapter 7 in this volume). Yet, religion does play an important role through membership in religious organizations (Eggert and Giugni [10] in this volume). Being a member of religious organizations, at least (or especially) for migrants of a certain religious denomination (Muslims) and in certain contexts (culturally pluralist ones), results in higher levels of political participation. In fact, organizational membership is by far the individual-level factor that contributes the most to accounting for variations in the political participation and integration of migrants in European cities. We discuss this aspect in the next section.
Voluntary associations: the role of social capital
One of the main goals of the research project upon which this book is drawn was to assess the role of voluntary associations for the political participation and integration of migrants in European cities. In doing so, we explicitly referred to the concept of social capital and the literature stressing its impact on various aspects of individual and collective behaviour, including political behaviour (Bourdieu, 1984 (Bourdieu, , 1986 Coleman, 1988 Coleman, , 1990 Putnam, 1993 Putnam, , 2000 see Lin, 2001 and Portes, 1998 for overviews). According to this body of literature, voluntary associations produce social capital which, in turn, has positive effects (but see Portes, 1998) on society, such as increasing government performance (Putnam, 1993) , creating group solidarity and civic culture (Almond and Verba, 1963; Putnam, 2000) and improving the quality of democracy (Paxton, 2002) . In fact, there are two different perspectives on the role of social capital: a group-level approach (such as Putnam, 1993 Putnam, , 2000 and an individual-level approach (such as Coleman, 1988 Coleman, , 1990 . While the former basically argues that social capital is a product of organizational networks and density, the latter maintains that it primarily stems from individual involvement in associations. In other words, while the former stresses the collective goods arising from social capital, the latter is more concerned with individual goods (Li et al., 2005) . Social capital theory was brought into the study of the political integration of migrants by Fennema and Tillie (1999, 2001 , 2004: 421) . Ethnic organizational networks reflect the amount of social capital at the group level which, in turn, depends on the number of organizations, the variety in the activities of the organizations, and the density of the organizational network (Tillie, 2004) . Recent work has studied the role of the structure and density of organizational networks for migrants (Bloemraad, 2006a; Pilati, 2008; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008; Vermeulen, 2006) , including a special issue of the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (see Schrover and Vermeulen, 2005) . More recently, however, Fennema and Tillie, together with a number of colleagues, have refocused the analysis of the impact of social capital on the political participation of migrants at the individual level, arguing that such an impact should be looked at that level of analysis (Jacobs and Tillie, 2004) . In this perspective, social capital does not only derive from organizational networks as such, but it is translated into individual resources through their involvement in organizations. As a result, although there is a relationship between the two levels insofar as the quality of the individual networks of members of an ethnic community is determined by the structure of the organizational network (Tillie, 2004) , in order to explain the political integration of migrants we must take into account their involvement in voluntary associations at the individual level. A number of studies conducted in several European cities and published in a special issue of the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (see Jacobs and Tillie, 2004) have demonstrated the crucial role of different types of associational involvement (in particular, in ethnic and cross-ethnic organizations) on the political participation of migrants.
The analyses presented in this book have confirmed the key relevance of individual involvement in voluntary associations not only for the political participation and integration of migrants, but also as predictors of political orientations such as interest in politics, efficacy and confidence in political institutions. Organizational membership, a variable that is included in most of the analyses presented in the previous chapters, is generally a significant predictor of most indicators of political integration that we use and exerts a positive effect on all. Thus, migrants who are involved in associations, either by being members of them or by participating in activities promoted by them, are more likely to participate politically and therefore are better integrated or included in the societies were they live.
The reasons why organizational involvement is so important are manifold. It may increase levels of civic skills and political knowledge, as stressed by the civic voluntarism model of political behaviour (Verba et al., 1995) . In a somewhat similar fashion, it may also serve as a channel of political information and recruitment (Rogers et al., 1975 , Knoke, 1982 , Pollock, 1982 . 
PROOF
In both cases, organizational involvement provides migrants with crucial individual resources to become involved in politics. But it may also foster group consciousness, as well as a sense of collective identity and awareness. In this perspective, voluntary associations stimulate political engagement by providing collective resources. The question of which of these mechanisms are operating remains open. However, it is sensible to assume that they all contribute in some way.
Yet not all kinds of organizational networks have the same impact. The most relevant distinction in this respect is that between ethnic and crossethnic (or non-ethnic) networks. While the former refers to embeddedness in associations composed fully or primarily by migrants or, even more specifically, by migrants of the same national origin, the latter includes both migrants and members of the native majority population. This distinction is strongly related to that between bridging and bonding social capital (Putnam, 2000) . Bonding social capital lies within a specific group, whereas bridging social capital overcomes certain cleavages, in this case the ethnic cleavage, and reaches out to other groups. Previous work has shown that both ethnic and cross-ethnic organizations have an important impact on the political participation of migrants (Berger et al., 2004; Eggert and Giugni, 2010; Jacobs et al., 2004; Tillie, 2004; Togeby, 2004) .
However, these two types of organizational networks and social capital might have a differential impact. Specifically, as stressed by some authors (cf. Portes, 1998), social capital can also have negative externalities and, hence, denser networks alone may not be sufficient to promote political integration into the receiving polity if this high connectivity remains ethnically segregated and contributes to the further isolation of the migrant groups. Consequently, bridging social capital is expected to have beneficial properties for the political integration of migrants, both at the individual and group levels, whereas bonding social capital might have no impact or a different one that relates to the nature of participation. Although this distinction is used in other chapters as well, we devoted a specific chapter to assessing the impact of organizational networks on the political inclusion of migrants (Morales and Pilati, Chapter 5 in this volume). An important finding of that chapter is that migrants embedded in ethnic social structures are more likely to be attentive to and active in politics that relates to their own ethnic group, while they are less inclined to sustain attitudes and behaviours with a focus on local, national or cross-ethnic issues. However, no evidence was found that ethnic bonding at the group level had any impact on individual-level political integration. In addition, the results shown in another chapter (Anduiza and San Martín, Chapter 9 in this volume) suggest that involvement in ethnic associations does not increase political efficacy and confidence in political institutions. Thus, the results presented throughout this volume show that it is important to go beyond the simple analysis of whether migrant groups with denser inter-organizational networks are more 
Political opportunities: the role of political capital
Political inclusion does not occur in a vacuum. Quite on the contrary, both in its behavioural and attitudinal dimensions, political inclusion is likely to depend in important ways on the context and the political capital migrants can draw from it. The most obvious way in which this may occur is through effective integration policies implemented by national or local governments (Penninx and Martiniello, 2004; Penninx, 2006) . Various works have shown the impact of state policies on the political incorporation of immigrants and, more generally, the relationship between the state, citizenship and immigration (Brubaker, 1992; Castles, 1995; Favell, 1998; Freeman, 1995; Joppke, 1999; Kastoryano, 1996; Safran, 1997; Soysal, 1994; ) . Most of these works focus on national policies, but some have looked more specifically at the role of local policies (Garbaye, 2005; Helbling, 2008; Ireland, 1994; Penninx et al., 2004) . Given our more specific focus on political participation as a core component of the political inclusion of migrants, in this volume we have borrowed the concept of political opportunities from the literature on social movements and contentious politics (see Kriesi, 2004 and Meyer, 2004 for overviews) to capture those aspects of the political context of migrants in the city of residence that may impinge on their political inclusion. In this regard, one of the major findings of our study, together with the impact of organizational membership and involvement, is evidence that political opportunities are crucial in channelling the participation of migrants and in accounting for the variations in the degree of political integration of migrants both across cities and across groups. This key role of political opportunities was shown above all in a chapter entirely devoted to this aspect of our research (Cinalli and Giugni, Chapter 3 in this volume), but emerged also in other chapters in which political opportunities were taken into account, either directly or indirectly. The analysis undertaken by Cinalli and Giugni in this volume points to a significant impact of political opportunity structures on the political participation of migrants in our cities. In particular, political participation appears to be spurred by more inclusive policies that grant migrants individual rights of access to citizenship, as well as by more inclusive policies regarding the recognition of collective group rights.
This conclusion about the key importance of the citizenship and policy context can also be drawn from the analysis of the role of political opportunity structures in other chapters in this volume, especially the chapters by González-Ferrer (4), Morales and Pilati (5) and Morales and Morariu (7). Their results confirm the fundamentally positive effect that more open citizenship regimes -in the dimension of their attribution of individual rights -has on migrants' political integration. These findings are consistent with Howard's (2009: 7-8, 204 ) assertion that naturalization and citizenship acquisition rules are of crucial importance for immigrants' integration and that they have long-term effects. Equally, they support the view that citizenship policies and integration regimes still matter despite recent trends of convergence (Alba and Foner, 2009 ). Yet, the findings about the effect of open regulations with regard to group rights are more mixed. While Cinalli and Giugni (Chapter 3 in this volume) find a positive and significant effect on overall levels of political participation by migrants, Morales and Pilati (Chapter 5 in this volume) find no significant main effect for interest in politics, and opposite effects for political contacting and for protesting. Morales and Pilati also find that the attribution of group rights, interestingly enough, often moderates the usually negative effect of ethnic bonding on the various indicators studied of political integration into mainstream politics. Equally, the two chapters in this volume that look at the archetypical multicultural case of Stockholm (Strömblad et al. [6] and Myrberg and Rogstad [8]) do not indicate that multicultural policies are necessarily more effective than those undertaken in other countries in achieving the political integration of migrants. Hence, more thorough analyses are needed in this direction as the relationship between political opportunities and participation is far from being simple and linear. And, in particular, there is no clear evidence that multicultural policies are more effective in all cases, once individual rights are plentiful and generous (see also Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2010) .
In addition to examining the role of institutional opportunities stemming from national and local state policies, following recent work on the political mobilization of migrants (Giugni and Passy, 2004, 2006; Koopmans et al., 2005) , we also took into account the impact of the discursive context faced by migrants in their city of residence. We referred to this as a 'discursive opportunity structure'. The findings shown in Chapter 3 (Cinalli and Giugni), which was specifically devoted to this aspect, clearly show that discourse matters a lot as more open discursive opportunities encourage the political participation of migrants, or at least they offer a favourable context to it. This, we think, represents an original contribution to the literature on the political engagement of migrants as few previous works have looked at the ways in which the prevailing discourses on immigration and ethnic relations politics impinge upon the political participation of migrants. Furthermore, these previous studies deal with the national level and focus on collective mobilizations, whereas we have examined the impact of discursive opportunities on the individual participation of migrants at the local level, showing that they also play a crucial role in this regard. Towards an integrated approach to the study of the political inclusion of migrants
Where does all this lead us with regard to the political integration or inclusion of migrants in European cities? We believe that this book is a modest example of what Bleich (2008b) describes as 'type 4' scholarship, which attempts to combine theory development -and in our case, also theory assessment -with theoretical roots that bridge across different subfields in political science and sociology, and that aims at reaching a wide audience beyond the subfield of immigration studies. In this sense, we hope that the contributions in this volume have shown that accounting for the political engagement of migrants and their descendants in Europe is not a simple task and requires that we look at the problem from different angles. We have proposed a multilevel approach that focuses on the individual characteristics of migrants, voluntary associations and political opportunities. In other words, adequate accounts of migrants' political integration need to examine and consider the human, social and political capital -and the multiple origins of such capital -that make migrants more (or less) likely to become integrated in their countries and cities (and, more generally, place) of residence. However, looking at the various types of capital or resources that favour political inclusion is not sufficient. We need a truly integrated approach that also considers how these various factors interact, not only because political inclusion is a multidimensional concept that requires us to take into account a variety of explanatory factors, but also because the types of capital we have described are often related to each other. In this book we have only lightly touched upon such an integrated approach as most of the analyses presented in the volume have focused mostly on the individual-level factors while also considering political opportunities.
Indeed, some of the chapters have tried to go a step farther and to examine how human capital, social capital, and political capital combine to explain the political inclusion of migrants (especially, Cinalli and Giugni [3] , and Morales and Pilati [5] ). The most interesting finding in this respect is that political opportunities and organizational involvement (hence, political capital and social capital) interact in important yet not always predictable ways (see Morales and Pilati, Chapter 5 in this volume). But other combinations among the three sets of factors can be imagined and indeed observed as well.
Yet, as we indicated in the introduction to this volume, the theoretical framework upon which this book rests foresees a path going from political opportunities to organizational networks and finally to political inclusion, with the individual characteristics of migrants also being influenced by the other two sets of factors. Methodologically, this conceptual scheme should be tackled in more depth in further analyses of the data we have collected in this project and with more sophisticated statistical techniques. The analyses presented in this volume constitute a first detailed foray into the rich dataset we have collectively compiled and we suggest that further research in this direction should be fruitful. Finally, we want to highlight that the idea that the political participation and inclusion of migrants should be understood as a result of the combination or, even better, the mutual influence of human capital, social capital and political capital; this has a number of practical and policy implications. The most fundamental one, in terms of 'institutional engineering', is that public policies will not have uniform effects on all migrants indiscriminately, as if they were all in the same situation and all had the same needs. Quite to the contrary, state actors (governmental, parliamentary, administrative) must take into account the varying discursive contexts in which different groups of migrants live, the varying social and organizational networks in which they are embedded, the varying individual characteristics and resources they bring with them, and so forth. They must also consider that the degree of social and political involvement varies substantially from one group of migrants to the other, as well as from one individual migrant to the other.
Our findings defy simplistic accounts or policy recommendations of what will work best in achieving the desired and desirable outcome of migrants' integration into the body politic. On the one hand, it leaves still wide open the debate on whether multicultural policies are the best approach to achieving integration (see the collection of essays in Joppke and Lukes, 1999, for the terms of this debate). Of course, we only evaluate one component of integration -its political dimension -but the overall conclusion is that, while we find no conclusive evidence that multicultural policies are detrimental to migrants' political integration, we also do not find strong evidence that would support the claim that they are to be preferred. In fact, we find that, for example, the archetypal republican and assimilationist approach preferred in France is indeed very effective in producing 'Frenchmen', as Schain (1999) has argued.
The results presented throughout this book also underscore the point that public policies, institutional design, and public and elite discourses are key determinants of migrants' political integration and in many cases much more so than ethnicity (see Ireland, 2004 for similar conclusions) or religious traditions. Moreover, we also show that, though important, the distinction between 'new' and 'old' countries of immigration does not always operate in expected directions, as the specific approaches to citizenship and integration often override the importance of that distinction. Thus, even if some (cf. Martiniello, 2009) would argue that the political mobilization of immigrants is not a priority on the agenda of the new destination countries like Spain, Italy and Hungary, we have found that in many cases the levels of political integration of migrants in the studied cities in these countries do Overall, then, the policy implications of our study point to the need to be cautious with blanket policy recommendations. Only by acknowledging the multidimensional nature of political inclusion, as well as the multiple and interactive character of the factors affecting it, will we be in a position to ascertain whether multicultural democracy works. 
